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EQUAL PROTECTION AND PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS
FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE
Approximately fifty miles west of Detroit lies the "sleepy little
town" 1 of Plymouth, Michigan, whose population is about 9,000. The
citizens of Plymouth have proclaimed it "The City of Homes," because
eighty to eighty-five per cent of the dwelling units there are privately
owned houses.'
Peter D. Schweitzer lived in one of the remaining fifteen to twenty
per cent dwelling units when he decided to run for city commissioner.
Following correct procedure, he submitted a nominating petition with
forty signatures to the Plymouth Election Commission. The Commission informed him, however, that his name could not be placed on the
ballot because he did not meet all the eligibility requirements as set out
in section 4.4 of the city's home rule charter. Although Schweitzer had
resided in Plymouth long enough to satisfy its residency requirement,
he could not fulfill the requirement that the holder of every elective office
"shall also have been, for a period of two years, prior to the date of his
election . . to office, the owner of property located within and assessed
for taxes by the city." '
Schweitzer and several citizens who had signed his petition set
to
out challenge the constitutionality of this qualification and petitioned
for a writ of mandamus ordering the city clerk to place his name on
the ballot. This challenge was unsuccessful in the Michigan Supreme
Court, which held in Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth4 that
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution was not
violated by a qualification which prevented persons who had not been
assessed for property taxes from holding public office.5
I. PRESENT STATUS OF PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS
In the first third of the century, several state supreme courts reviewed similar qualifications for public office and found them valid

I Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 493, 164 N.W2d
35, 39 (1969), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. May 2, 1969) (No.
1349, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 95, 1969 Term).
2
AppendLx to Brief for Appellant at 23a, Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of
Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W2d 35 (1969).
3 Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 488 n.1, 164
N.W.2d 35, 37 n.1 (1969), quoting City of Plymouth Charter § 4.4.
4Id. at 485, 164 N.W2d at 35 (1969).
5Although the plaintiff is a minister, issues of religious liberty were raised by
neither counsel. Plaintiff's counsel alluded to clergymen simply as a group often
disadvantaged by the property qualification, noting that "[a]s a minister, Reverend
Brief for
. ."
Schweitzer was furnished residential quarters by his church .
Appellee at 9, Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W.2d

35 (1969).
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when not in conflict with specific provisions in state constitutions.6 In
1937, for example, the New York Court of Appeals approved the state's
property requirements. 7 Very recently, however, in Landes v. Town of
North Hempstead,' the New York court overruled its earlier findings
of constitutionality in light of "[r]ecent developments in constitutional
law, as well as changes in the pattern of town and suburban living
9 The New York court found that social changes had elim.
.
inated any significant differences between property owners and renters
for purposes of office holding, leaving no justification for the qualiThen, analogizing to recent Supreme Court decisions profication.'
hibiting restrictions on the franchise based on wealth " or place of
residence,' 2 the court held that a property qualification could not be
permitted to restrict the ability of electors to vote for anyone they might
choose.'3 The Michigan Supreme Court in Schweitzer disputed both
these propositions, denying that social changes affecting the state of
New York had reached Plymouth, or that the voting cases provided
analogies for ruling on office-holding qualifications.' 4 These disagreements stem from different judgments the courts made about their
ability to review legislative determinations on the subject of qualifications for public office.
More than one standard has been used by the Supreme Court in
determining whether state legislation has violated the equal protection
clause." The basic criterion for constitutionality is that classifications
established by the states "must always rest upon some difference which
bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed .... "16 In addition, classifications must
serve some legitimate state purpose. 7 The Supreme Court has given
the states every benefit of the doubt in applying this test, especially in
But it has also devised a more
cases involving economic regulation.'
certain "suspect" characteron
stringent test for classifications based
."

6

See State ex rel. Workman v. Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N.E. 133 (1909)

(qualification held valid) ; Powell v. Hart, 132 La. 287, 61 So. 233 (1913) (qualification held invalid) ; State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 P. 274 (1898)
(valid); State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 18 S.E. 770 (1893)
(valid).
7 See Becraft v. Strobel, 274 N.Y. 577, 10 N.E2d 560 (1937).
820 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S2d 441 (1967).
9Id. at 419, 231 N.E.2d at 121, 284 N.Y.S2d at 443.
1' Id. at 421, 231 N.E2d at 122, 284 N.Y.S2d at 444.
"1See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax
held unconstitutional).
12

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

2320 N.Y.2d at 421, 231 N.E.2d at 122, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45.

'14See 381 Mich. at 491-94, 164 N.W2d at 38-39.
'5 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 353 (1949); Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its
Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394, 399 (1964).
'6Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
' 7 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
'8See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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istics,' 9 or which result in deprivation of certain "fundamental rights." 20
Such a classification, "even though enacted pursuant to a valid state
interest, bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld
only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." 21
Therefore, even though a property qualification can withstand the
above mentioned reasonable relationship test, it may demand analysis
under the latter, and more stringent, "necessity" test. Three recent
cases suggest that the property qualifications involved in Schweitzer
and Landes may require this type of additional analysis and justification.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,' the Court added classifications based on wealth to the "suspect" group. In Williams v.
Rhodes,2 - the Court held that state laws which effectively prevent a
political party from appearing on the ballot infringe upon the "fundamental rights" of voting and political association. Finally, in Kramer
24
the Court struck down a state law
v. Union Free School District,
which prevented an otherwise qualified bachelor from voting in a school
district election, because he neither had a child attending the local
schools nor owned (or leased) taxable property. Therefore, if it can be
demonstrated that the right to vote effectively and the right to run
for public office are fundamental rights, and, in turn, these rights are
impinged upon by the property qualification in the absence of a compelling state interest, then the constitutional requisite of equal protection has been violated. However, it is difficult to make this type of
judgment. The scope of the three decisions mentioned above is as
yet undefined. Indeed, the Court has been criticized for failing to
elaborate a rational standard, or even points of reference, by which to
judge what activities are to receive favored treatment as "fundamental
rights" under the equal protection clause 5 The Schweitzer court,
however, did not even consider whether this higher standard should be
applied. Neither, in fact, did it bother to apply the basic reasonable
relationship test. It is the contention of this Comment that if it had
applied either test, the Schweitzer court could not have concluded that
Plymouth's property qualification was valid.
1
1JSee McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Oyamna v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (dictum); Truax

v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

2osee Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312 (1921) (conducting business) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (working).
21 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ; see Wesberry v. Sanders,

376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
22 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax held unconstitutional).
23393 U.S. 23 (1968).
24 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
25See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)

(Black,
J., dissenting); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HAv. L. REV. 91, 95 (1966).
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PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE
REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST

The Michigan court began its analysis with the assumption that
if a regulation does not interfere with the personal liberty of citizens or
the enjoyment of their property, "the same standards of reasonableness
and relationship to purpose as are found in cases dealing with regulations under the police power" need not be applied.26 Admittedly, voting
in municipal elections and running for municipal offices are "political
rights," 27 extended by the sovereign, and consequently the due process
clause of the United States Constitution does not protect a personal or
property right to hold office.2" However, once the franchise has been
extended to some citizens, or municipal offices have been established,
the equal protection clause does not permit arbitrary exclusions from
these political rights.20 Indeed, for the question of voting the Supreme
Court has established stricter standards to judge the validity of a discriminatory classification.
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis
always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective
voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect
their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the
right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and
citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must
determine whether the exclusions
are necessary to promote a
80
compelling state interest.
From its original erroneous assumption that the reasonable relationship test need not be applied where the state's police power is not
involved 41 -an assumption unsupported by cases-the Schweitzer court
concluded that qualifications for office-holding may be "arbitrary" or
"parochial and intolerant," as long as they have been determined by a
majority of the voters.8 2 As examples of such "essentially arbitrary"
qualifications, the court cited the provisions in the United States Constitution which set minimum age limits for the President and congressmen 33 as well as state requirements for the minimum and maximum
age limits which exist for most state offices. 4 Having mature officials,
however, is a legitimate governmental purpose, and it can reasonably be
26 381 Mich. at 492, 164 N.W2d
27
Note 54 infra & accompanying
28
See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham,
2 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of

at 38.
text.
178 U.S. 548 (1900).
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) ; Snowden

v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (dictum).

30 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
81
Note 26 supra & accompanying text.
32 381 Mich. at 493, 164 N.W2d at 39.
33 For these provisions, see U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 1.
84 381 Mich. at 492, 164 N.W2d at 38.
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believed that a candidate's age is directly related to his maturity.
Admittedly, if the Michigan court had scrutinized Plymouth's property
qualification on the basic level of reasonable relationship, it probably
could have found some rational reasons for the property requirement.
The traditional justification for property requirements, traceable to
colonial America, is that property holders have a greater "stake in
society" ; 35 presumably they have a greater "interest in the welfare and
prosperity of their permanent dwelling place." " The city of Plymouth
contended that since the city commissioners have the power to borrow
money secured by property tax revenues and to tax property in order
to operate the local government, the qualification was necessary to protect the "citizens of the City of Plymouth, in and the preservation of
their property." " This argument assumes, of course, that the taxpayers will be more economical in administering town affairs because
their own money is being spent.
The Landes court challenged similar arguments when it stated:
[W]e fail to see how . . . qualities of carefulness and frugal-

ity were ever the monopoly of those owning real property.
.. In a society such as ours, characterized by its
"mobility" and "anonymity" [citation omitted], a landowner
is no more likely to be permanently established in a townand, by that token, better qualified to govern-than one who
is not a property owner.38
Judgments of this type are particularly vulnerable to attack. The
court here is really setting up its own evaluation of society as the only
reasonable one which a legislative body may hold. Even if these
generalizations are valid for most of America, may they be used by
courts to strike down legislation for the sleepy little towns such as
Plymouth, Michigan? It must be noted that the New York and Michigan courts were reviewing laws of different scope. In Schweitzer, the
Michigan court upheld a provision enacted under the broad mandate of a
home rule charter, which applied only to the locality involved. On the
other hand, the Landes court struck down a provision of New York's
33 Brown, Reinterpretation of the Formation of the American Constitution, 42
B.U.L. REv. 413, 421 (1962). Brown makes clear, however, that property qualifications did not disenfranchise most colonists.
The amount of property required for voting in the colonies was not sufficient
to exclude any but the very poorest men, if those. The 40 s. freehold required
for the vote in some colonies meant real estate that would rent for 40 s. a
year, the equivalent of ten day's [sic] wages for a carpenter. By comparison,
ten day's wages for a carpenter today would not even pay a year's rent on a
single room.
Id. 422.
86 State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 494, 18 S.E. 770, 773
(1893), quoted in; Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 493 n.6,
164 N.W2d 35, 39 n.5 (1969).
37 Brief for Appellant at 14, Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich.
485, 164 N.W,2d 35 (1969) (emphasis in original).
38 20 N.Y2d at 420-21, 231 N.E2d at 122, 284 N.Y.S2d at 444.
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Town Law which applied to urbanized, suburbanized, and rural communities. 9 Landes, however, was not couched in self-limiting terms.
The opinion's expansive focus implies that no community could validly
establish a property qualification, even if the qualification extended no
further than the town lines.
The Landes majority found precedent for this evaluation in
the Harper case, where the Supreme Court held that a poll tax on state
elections violated the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Douglas
writing for the Court stated: "Voter qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax." 40 This
statement should be even more applicable to Plymouth's requirement
than to the New York Town Law involved in Landes. While New
York simply demanded that public officials be freeholders, 4 the
Plymouth ordinance demands that they pay real or personal property
tax for two years prior to election.42 However, in Harper the Court
was dealing with the fundamental right of voting, which biased its
factual determinations against the state; as yet, running for office has
not been explicitly established as such a right. The Landes court overlooked the additional consideration that certain qualifications may be
more relevant to an official's task than to a voter's. The representative
who actually handles tax money may encounter temptations, and therefore he may need a higher standard of frugality than the voter (who
probably endorses economical government whether or not he pays
taxes). Finally, although a poll tax simply tests a voter's wealth, a
property requirement may test a candidate's stability and interest in the
community. Even wealthy people who have their holdings in forms
not taxable by the city will be ineligible for office.4" Thus the Landes
majority was begging important factual questions when it based its
findings on Harper's rejection of wealth as a criterion for voting.
No doubt there are many arguments, aside from the one raised in
Landes, which may overwhelm the traditional reasoning that serves as
a premise for property qualifications. Renters suffer from property
taxes indirectly through rent increases. Furthermore, if their poverty
forces them to rent, they have as much of a stake in the prosperity of
their community as propertied residents; having too little money to be
mobile, they are the first to suffer during hard times. Also, because
they have as much to gain from fiscal responsibility as do other members
39 N.Y. TowN LAv §§ 23, 23-a (McKinney 1965).
40383 U.S. at 666 (1966).
41 N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 23, 23-a (McKinney 1965).
42381 Mich. at 488, 164 N.W'2d at 36.
43
See id. at 497, 164 N.W2d at 41 (dissenting opinion). Although in practice any
wealthy person who wished to become city commissioner could purchase 2 sewing
machines, for example, thereby obtaining the necessary property qualification, he
would be disadvantaged by the 2 year waiting period during which he would have to
pay taxes on that property. See MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 211.9 (1967) for a list
of personal property exempted from the property tax. Most property which the
average renter uses for personal consumption is exempted.
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of the community, renters may be just as interestd as homeowners in
the use of tax money. Renters may even be as interested as homeowners in keeping taxes low, in order to prevent the tax base from
moving elsewhere. Finally, citizens may not always act strictly on the
basis of their own monetary interests, and as a result the interests of
propertied and nonpropertied citizens need not be antithetical. But are
these propositions so well established that a town cannot reasonably
conclude to the contrary about its own population? Assuming arguendo
that there is no fundamental right involved which would weight the
reasonableness standard in favor of the deprived minority, there may
be a more fruitful method of measuring property qualifications by the
reasonable relation standard.
As early as 1885, the Supreme Court, in discussing aspects of the
municipal police power, distinguished two types of regulations. One
regulation "may press with more or less weight upon one than upon
another, but [it is] designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good." " The other type is simply
"[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others
This reasoning is, of course, equally applicable to quali.
.
" 4
fications for a candidate. If a regulation which works to the detriment
of one class is imposed simultaneously with a regulation which does
not, and both regulations serve essentially the same purpose, we may
assume that the first regulation is an unnecessary inconvenience for
members of the disadvantaged group. Moreover, we may suspect that
its purpose is simply to give the favored group an improper advantage.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erickson 4 used
analysis consistent with the above approach 4 7 to invalidate a referendum
procedure which made it especially difficult for a city to pass a fair
housing ordinance protecting racial and religious minorities. The
Court found that the usual referendum procedures, which applied to
fair housing ordinances designed to protect any group, were sufficient
to serve the purposes of "mov[ing] slowly in the delicate area of race
relations .

.

.

. The amendment was unnecessary either to implement

a decision to go slowly, or to allow the people of Akron to participate in
that decision." 4 Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash,49 the Supreme
Court held that a state could not bar all servicemen from voting in its
elections, even if it reasonably feared their transiency and consequent
political views, as long as it could rely on its general requirement that
all voters be bona fide residents.
44 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-33 (1885) (empbasis added).
415M. at 32.
46393 U.S. 385 (1969).
47 See id. at 393-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48Id. at 392.

49 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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In the instant case, several regulations governing the qualifications
and permissible activities of city commissioners already exist in
Plymouth. These regulations make the taxable property qualification
unnecessary. First, Plymouth's requirement that all office holders must
have been residents for two years prior to their election counters the
complaint that renters are uninterested transients. Renters who have
lived in the city for two years have sufficiently demonstrated that they
are willing to take the responsibility for their votes, and to live with the
consequences. They certainly do not reach the depths ascribed to them
in a quote cited by the majority in Schweitzer as a possible rationale for
property qualifications. This description likens renters to "Bedouins
of the plains," who "'neath the shadows of night . . . can fold their
tents, and silently steal away" " after they have wrecked the fortunes
of the frugal property owners.
Second, a locally imposed ceiling on property tax assessments
meets the argument that only propertied commissioners will be restrained in exercising their power to raise and spend tax money to
which they must contribute. Section 10.5 of the Plymouth charter
limits the assessment rate for municipal purposes to one and one-half
per cent, subject both to increases when approved by a majority of the
electors and to state provisions controlling redemption of municipal
bonds. 1 In addition, although Michigan requires unlimited assessments for paying off municipal indebtedness, the Plymouth charter
limits the amount of net bonded indebtedness which may be incurred. "2
Thus unpropertied commissioners cannot spend blithely in the knowledge that they can always raise more tax money from propertied citizens
to meet their expenses.
By these provisions, Plymouth's property holding majority has
insured that their tax money will be spent economically. Therefore,
the added property qualification for commissioners unfortunately appears as an attempt by the property holders to insure that all decisions
by the commission will be made in the property owners' interests, not
in the interests of the community as a whole. Although economy is a
legitimate governmental purpose, designed to advantage no particular
group, government in favor of propertied citizens is not. 3 Thus the
Plymouth property qualification is placed in jeopardy when scrutinized
under the basic reasonable relationship test. The qualification serves
few purposes besides those which are otherwise insured, while it raises
unfortunate suspicions about the motivation behind it.
50 State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 495, 18 S.E. 770, 773
(1893), quoted in 381 Mich. at 493 n. 6 , 164 N.W2d at 39 n.5.
1 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 11a, 31a, Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of
Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W2d 35 (1969).
52Id.at 35a.
53Notes

44-49 supra & accompanying text.
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III. A

STRICTER STANDARD

FOR OFFICE-HOLDING QUALIFICATIONS

Whatever doubt exists about the validity of property qualifications
under the reasonable relationship test is dispelled in favor of unpropertied citizens if the stricter standard for fundamental rights is applied.
Whether this standard should be applied here depends upon the resolution of two separate but integrally related issues that were merged in
the Schweitzer case. The first, and the most obvious, is whether the
right to run for elected office is indeed a fundamental right which can be
restricted only by a compelling state interest.": The second issue, one
which does not surface immediately, is whether the residents of
Plymouth, by a majority vote, can constitutionally impose restrictive
qualifications on certain offices when such qualifications affect only a
portion of an otherwise qualified body of persons.
The Michigan court, combining these two issues, did not find
holding office fundamental in any sense; rather, the court found that
establishing qualifications for public office, unlike establishing voting
The court explained that
qualifications, is a "political decision."
"[iln a democracy, the majority rules.

.

The majority of the

people of Plymouth have established the qualifications for their city
commissioners." 6 Presumably, then, once a majority of voters has
coalesced, free of unnecessary voting qualifications, they should be able
to choose the qualifications for public office which suit them. As the
court stated: "It is peculiarly so, since the same majority which establishes the qualification elects the office-holders. If a candidate has the
votes to be elected, then he has the votes to change the eligibility requirement; and if he doesn't have the votes to change the qualification,
then he does not have the votes to be elected." " Such assertions by
the court are assailable both factually and constitutionally.
In addressing the candidacy issue, we begin with the premise that
a candidate's right to run for elected office is a corollary to the right to
vote for that candidate. When only one candidate represents the
political views of a segment of the electorate, and he is prevented from
running, then those voters who support him have lost an opportunity
to cast their vote effectively. This problem arose in Williams v.
Rhodes'i when George Wallace's American Independent Party was
denied a place on Ohio's presidential ballot.
Mr. Justice Black's plurality opinion in that case held first "that
no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's command that 'No State shall . . .deny to any person
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
r5 381 Mich. at 492, 164 N.W2d at 39.
66Id.
57 Id.

68 393 U.S. 23

(1968).

138

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.118:129

• . . the equal protection of the laws.' " " The opinion then focused
on the question whether a state law requiring, inter alia, a new political
party to present a petition for position on the ballot which bore signatures of "qualified electors totaling 15%o of the number of ballots cast
in the last preceding gubernatorial election" " violated the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Black found that the law burdened both
the right of political association and the right to vote "effectively."
Since the state could show no compelling interest justifying these
burdens, the Court found the law unconstitutional in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the plurality
opinion, but stressed that any compelling interest of the state was
irrelevant.61
The meaning of Mr. Justice Black's reference to the right to vote
"effectively" was perhaps clarified by Mr. Justice Douglas when he
stated, "I would think that a State has precious little leeway in making
it difficult or impossible for citizens to vote for whomsoever they please
... "='Although
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred only in the result,
because he relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
he also implied that the right of political association embraced a right
of candidacy. He stated that Ohio, "by denying the appellants any
opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the President is
selected, . . . has eliminated the basic incentive [of all political
parties]." " The incentive is the election of the party's candidate. Restricting candidacy, at least in the case of a charismatic candidate appealing to a disenchanted electorate, restricts effective political organization,
a fundamental right." Demanding a compelling state interest to restrict effective political organization without demanding a similar
interest in restricting candidacy abandons the safeguards on the initial
right of political association.
It is now necessary to apply the principles of effective political
organization and its corollary, the right to run for elected office, to
Plymouth, Michigan. Factually, there is no reason to believe that
property holders would not find attractive a candidate willing to represent their interests, but unable to satisfy the property-holding requirement. A wealthy person, for example, who might appeal to propertied
interests, might simply be unable to put his holdings in taxable forms
soon enough before the election to qualify for the ballot."a Thus, even
though the home-owning majority might fear unpropertied persons as
-9 Id.

at 29.

60 Id. at 24-25.

61 See id. at 39-40.
62 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
6

3Id.

at 41.

64 Id.at 42.

105
A candidate's property must be taxed for 2 years before he becomes eligible
for elective office. 381 Mich. at 488 n.1, 164 N.W2d at 37 n.1 (1969).
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a class, and hence be unwilling to change the general property qualification, it might still desire to support one particular unpropertied
candidate.
More important, free access to public office is not merely a
political question 6 but is fundamental to American democracy. Although, as Schweitzer correctly states, "[A] minority cannot have an
equal right to govern," " a minority must have an equal chance to
participate in government, regardless of whether it prevails s The
promise of democracy is that today's minorities, through rational persuasion and political maneuvering, can become tomorrow's majority.
This promise is dashed if today's majority biases the structure of
governmental institutions in favor of its own self-perpetuation. 69
Office-holding qualifications as well as voting qualifications may
produce such structural biases. Plymouth's property qualification, for
example, raises the danger that the city commissioners will often favor
property-holding citizens. Although all citizens are treated alike in
being prevented from voting for unpropertied candidates, it is likely
that the property-holding majority can find effective spokesmen from
the propertied candidates. The unpropertied citizens, on the other
hand, are denied many of their most responsive representatives when
they cannot choose candidates who share their position in the community. Voters may well feel that they are best represented by men
who can identify with, and therefore articulate, their problems. They
may find a man of their own circumstances more charismatic, and as
a result he may be more effective in precipitating political organization
and bargaining strength within the group. The voters who enacted the
property qualification, however, must have presumed that representatives with property would not act in accordance with the interests of
their unpropertied constituents. Otherwise, there would have been no
reason for the enactment since other provisions insure economical
This assumption is not unwarranted. In theory every
government.1
representative must respond to the needs of his constituency, or he will
be in danger at the next election. However, if no candidate represents
unpropertied interests, the unpropertied minority is left with no alternative choice. Their representatives have no incentive to respond to their
needs. Thus the process of rational persuasion and political maneuvering which shifts legislative majorities is distorted when participants do
not represent unpropertied interests as well as they represent propertied
interests.
66 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962).
67 381 Mich. at 493, 164 N.W2d at 39.
68 Cf. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-38 & n.31 (1964)
(majority cannot approve apportionment of state senate giving equal representation
to minority interests). See generally Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) :
"The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which
have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed." Text accompanying notes 77-82 infra.
09
70

Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393-96 (1969) (Harlan,
Notes 50-52 supra & accompanying text.

3., concurring).
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Even if Williams v. Rhodes 7 did not establish a fundamental right
to hold public office," it did hold that a restriction on who may run
for office simultaneously restricts the ability of each individual to vote
for the candidate of his choice, thereby impinging upon another fundamental right. Since Plymouth's property qualification allows propertied, but not unpropertied, voters to elect officials who share their
interests, the votes of unpropertied citizens are diluted and "ineffective"
in relation to the others. 3 Of course every restriction on who may run
for public office is not thereby prohibited, just as every restriction on
the franchise is not prohibited. 7 But in determining which restrictions
are constitutional, the test is not simply whether a reasonable relationship exists between the classification and the purposes of the legislation,
but, since important rights are involved, whether any "compelling state
interest" 75 justifies the deprivation suffered by some group or individuals. Here, the state has failed to show any compelling interest that
could justify the property requirement. Plymouth's limitations on the
city council's power to incur debts removes the objection that unpropertied persons will improvidently expend tax revenues. The two-year
residency requirement assures that candidates have a personal interest
in the town's welfare.
Williams dealt with
However, one last distinction remains.
political parties and not individual candidates. Is this distinction
sufficient to preclude application of Williams to this case? In Williams,
the requirements for being placed on the ballot effectively applied to
candidates only if they were not affiliated with one of the two major
political parties.7 6 Any candidate unacceptable to these two parties was
disadvantaged because he had to form another party, with the attendant
overwhelming burdens. Thus the candidates and voters in Williams
came to court as members of particular political parties, and the Court
could emphasize the fact that their desire to organize had been thwarted.
In Schweitzer, however, the candidate was not disadvantaged because
of any party affiliation; and the voters who sued with him had not
formed any organization to further his campaign. The difference,
nonetheless, may be one of form and not substance. The only reason
for founding the American Independent Party, the party involved in
Williams, was to further the candidacy of George Wallace. There was
no intent to establish a party organization which would present candi-11393 U.S. 23 (1968).
72

When Mr. Justice Black demanded a compelling state interest to restrict the

right of association, he relied not on previous voting cases but on NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963). See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). His reluctance
to base the right of association on voting cases suggests that political association
rather than candidacy was the crucial issue in Williams, and therefore the implied
right of candidacy could be illusory.
is See id. at 31; cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1963).
74
See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
75 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
76 Id. at 25.
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dates of the American Independent Party at all levels of government.
By extension, once a candidate has achieved considerable political support, organized or not, disqualifying him denies political expression to
his supporters, who are prevented from rallying around their man and
from achieving effective political organization.
Even if the right to run for political office is not found to be fundamental, it would appear that the right to vote is limited by the Plymouth
property qualification, and, therefore, the state must demonstrate a
compelling interest to justify this limitation. Since Plymouth's city
council is restricted in its power to spend tax revenues, and the residency requirement prevents control by transients, the only possible compelling interest is that a majority of the residents of the community
chose to qualify the eligibility requirements for elective office.
The ability of a majority of the electorate to burden the voting rights
of a minority was considered by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. FortyFourth General Assembly. 77 The Court faced the issue whether a
majority of Colorado's voters could approve an apportionment scheme
for the state senate based on regions rather than population. The Court
held that apportionment of both houses of the legislature must be based
on population. The approved scheme deviated so far from a population
basis that it violated the equal protection clause."8 The Court stated:
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an
equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a
majority of a State's electorate .

.

.

.

Manifestly, the fact

that an apportionment plan is adopted in a popular referendum
is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality .

.

.

.

9

Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent strongly denied that Colorado's
apportionment scheme was other than representative government. He
would not have set aside the state's plan if Colorado could reasonably
justify it by demonstrating that the apportionment plan furthered a
rational, legislative purpose without frustrating majority will.80
Applying Lucas to the instant case, we note that malapportionment
is strikingly similar to restrictions on candidates. Both decrease the
effectiveness of the votes of a certain segment of the electorate; the
individual in a malapportioned district casts a diluted vote while the
unrepresented voter wastes his vote on unresponsive candidates. In
the absence of other compelling interests, the argument that a majority
of Plymouth's residents can render ineffective the fundamental right
of the unpropertied minority "to cast their votes effectively" " falls
before Lucas. Even if Mr. Justice Stewart's test of rational legislative
77377 U.S. 713 (1964).
78 Id.at 735.
79 Id. at 736.
so Id.at 753-54.
81
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
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purpose is utilized, the Michigan court conceded that the property qualification may be "parochial and intolerant." ' Consequently, Plymouth's
property qualification can muster no compelling interest to justify the
restrictions it places on the voting ability of unpropertied residents.

IV. CONCLUSION

A close analysis of the factual situation in Schweitzer demonstrates
that the property qualification ordinance is a violation of equal protection. Since there are already nondiscriminatory ordinances in the
township which effectively achieve the supposed purposes of the property qualification requirement, there appears to be no other rational
reason for the ordinance except to disadvantage renters. Moreover,
strong arguments can be made to show that this property qualification
would fall when analyzed under the stricter "necessity" test. In light
of recent Supreme Court decisions, the right to run for elective office
and/or the right to vote effectively should be considered fundamental
rights which can be subordinated only to a compelling state interest.
Again, due to the effectiveness of the other nondiscriminatory ordinances, the property qualifications cannot possibly serve any compelling
state interest. Hence, the property qualification should fall again.
Hopefully, courts that deal with situations similar to that found in
Schweitzer will attempt a more thorough analysis than the superficial
gloss developed by the Michigan Supreme Court.
8 381 Mich. at 493, 164 N.W2d at 39.

